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fyi > Issues June 12, 2008 IssuesConservative and Liberal senators agreed yesterday it's doubtful our troops will be home from Afghanistan by 2011. Troops won't be home by 2011: senators. Conservative Senators stuck to Government policy in voting against the recommendation to enter into negotiations, this despite the fact Chief of Defence Staff designate Lt. General Walter Natynczyk has personal contact with top American military personnel, an on the scene observer is suggesting a path that can be taken and the Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in a recently published monograph argues negotiations integrating most of the insurgents into the national power structure is desirable rather than the current American counter insurgency policy which is failing. That a course is presenting itself which offers the potentiality of withdrawal from Afghanistan where none exists at present or in the foreseeable future if the current path is followed, is argued immediately below in "CDS Walter Natynczyk: A New Hand on the Helm". An additional burden is being placed on Canadian Forces, that of protecting the Dahla dam work on which will not be completed by 2011. Backgrounding information relating to the project has been cited for your information _________________________________________________________ CDS Walter Natynczyk: A New Hand on the Helm "If you're not prepared to argue your corner eloquently, articulately, occasionally aggressively but always clearly, you can't be a CDS or you can't be a commander," (1) these words from Canada's current Chief of Defence Staff, who possessed the qualities he articulated, are necessary for the position from which he is retiring next month. Col. Dan Baggio, who served with Chief of Defence Staff designate Lt. General Walter Natynczyk in Baghdad, and until a few weeks ago, was responsible for army media relations at the Pentagon, describes the personal qualities of Canada's new CDS in these words: "I say this from my heart, I honestly have never heard a harsh word about Walt Natynczyk…. He is not a butt chewer, but a true team player. He had a way of interjecting thoughts so well you thought that they were your own ideas. He was open- minded to guidance from his staff and when he disagreed, he disagreed politely. For me, he is the consummate general officer." Positions held in Canada, in Korea, the Balkans and Iraq have provided a depth and breadth of experience that have prepared him for the tasks he will be undertaking which include continuing the rebuilding of the human and material capabilities of Canadian Forces and successfully carrying out missions, of which Canada's commitments in Afghanistan is the most important. His ability to work with Prime Minister Stephen Harper, who selected him for the post he is assuming, and Gen. David Petraeus, who runs the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan as the commander of CENTCOM and with whom he shared responsibilities Iraq, will determine whether the last task in his career will be a success. (2) Michael Byers wrote in the Edmonton Journal: "This country's ability to conduct its own analysis, and make its own decisions, was not curtailed when Parliament voted to extend the mission. Far from it: the fact that our soldiers are losing so much demands constant vigilance, the courage to stand up to allies, and a willingness to reconsider past decisions as new facts present themselves. In Vietnam, the United States' biggest mistake wasn't going to war, but stubbornly persisting as long as it did." (3) Maj.-Gen. Rick Formica, director of force management for the U.S. army, said of Natynczyk: "He is very, very strategically and operationally savvy." It is this quality together with his way of interjecting thoughts so well you thought that they were your own ideas cited by Col. Dan Baggio which will determine whether adjustment is made to new facts that are presenting themselves in Afghanistan. The insurgents are not being defeated, they are extending their operations up to and including attacking President Karzai on a grandstand in Kabul. Canada's last two battle deaths were as a result of gunfire in skirmishes not to improvised explosive devices as has been the general cause (to be accurate the last one fell in a well). Fire fights are won most often through calling in air strikes. The cost, however, is collateral damage such as killed and wounded civilians which creates an honour debt that supports the insurgency. The United States and its coalition allies in Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force have two choices: persisting in fighting a war that cannot be won on the battlefield or following the opinion of Dr. Steven Metz stated in his monograph Rethinking Insurgency. (4) The course being followed, that of supporting the national government that was created centred on President Karzai, is not succeeding. The alternative advanced by Dr. Metz is that of reaching for an "outcome which integrates most of the insurgents into the national power structure". Syed Saleem Shahzad the Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief shares Metz view, suggesting action be encouraged by "leading Muslim countries which still have influence over the Taliban, notably Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. If the Western coalition gives leeway to such countries to play a major role and at a later stage even replace NATO with Organization of Islamic Conference forces, a consensus government of the northern and southern forces could emerge." (5) As Canadian Chief of Defence Staff,Walter Natynczyk, having the confidence of American Command Staff is in the position to press eloquently, articulately, occasionally aggressively, but always clearly that this change of direction be taken. It is uncertain whether he will choose to do so and even if he does he will succeed in shifting the direction of the American ship of state from its current course. What is certain, however, is that without this change of direction by 2011, as he ends his third year as Chief of Defence Staff, the Parliament of Canada will once more be forced to decide whether to stay the course or withdraw Canadian Forces from Afghanistan. (1) Ottawa's next mission: Find a replacement (2) Natynczyk promotion to CDS popular with U.S. commanders (3) Paying heed to parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam (5) A struggle between war and peace _________________________________________________________ Backgrounding on the Dahla dam Here's a quarterly report to Parliament; Provincial profile for- Kandahar Province _________________________________________________________ 60 New Irrigation Gates Constructed and 26 Gates Rehabilitated from Dahla Dam to Tarnak Canal in Drought Hit South On a positive note for the first time in five years since the successive drought the Dahla dam is roaring again and water flowed from its spillways. This is the most famous and the third biggest dam in Afghanistan. 24 April _________________________________________________________ Afghanistan: Natural Resources and Energy Dahla Dam Kandahar province.Repaired and operational. _________________________________________________________ In addition to the Dahla Dam, Ottawa announced two other signature projects - countrywide polio eradication and 50 new schools with 3,000 trained teachers - and six priority objectives Perhaps in anticipation of this week's announcement, the Canadian military recently completed a new forward operating base near the Dahla Dam, about a 70-km road trip north of Kandahar City. _________________________________________________________ Government of Canada Sets Future Course for Engagement in Afghanistan Signature Project: Dahla Dam and Irrigation System _________________________________________________________ ARGÚANDAÚB, a river in the south of Afghanistan, the biggest tributary of the Helmand (q.v.); also the name of a dam and two districts in Afghanistan. The present name, in the form AÚb-e Arg@and, is attested from the 7th/13th century (Ôu@zèa@n^, T®abaqa@t II, p. 141). It replaced an old name which was Haraxúaiti in Avestan and became Arachôtos in the geography of Ptolemy, Rokòkòad-ru@d in the Ta@r^kò-e S^sta@n, and by metathesis Korad-ru@y in the geography of Moqaddas^ (p. 304). The Arg@anda@b originates at about 3,900 m above sea level in the Ku@h-e Sáaf^d, west of the Na@vor high plain (see DaÞt-e Na@vor), and after a course of 562 km joins the Helmand at Qal¿a-ye Bost (altitude 749 m). Its basin covers 52,955 km2 in Afghan territory, to which must be added a small area in Pakistan (east of Sp^n Bo@ldak) around the upper course of its main tributary, the Do@r^ (q.v.) river. The hydrology of the Arg@anda@b is now fairly well known. Table 6 gives the gist of the available data. In respect of discharge, three distinct sections in the river's course can be identified. The upper Arg@anda@b is perennial with a mountain re gime mainly determined by the snowmelt in the Haza@raèa@t high lands; its peak flows occur in April and May. Lower down, the influence of run off from rainfall is more marked and the peak flows are recorded in March and April; as the river approaches the Qandaha@r oasis, its average discharge shows a considerable decline due chiefly to diversion of water for irrigation (see below). In the lowest section, despite a perceptible rise in the average discharge due to the inflow from the Do@r^, which drains part of the Solayma@n mountains, seasonal and annual irregularity is greatest, periods of low water are longest (e.g., eight months recorded from 21 May 1971 to 16 January 1972 with no flow at all), and floods most impressive (1698 cubic meters per second recorded at Bost on 30 January 1950). The river, with its abundant water (the original meaning of its Avestan name, see AirWb., col. 1788) has a great impact on the economy of the arid southern Afghanistan. It is the main factor which has made possible the agriculture of the Qandaha@r oasis and therewith the prosperity of the city, which does not, however, lie on its banks. Local tradition maintains that a complex and well-designed network of irrigation canals existed in the 12th/18th century, when Qandaha@r was the capital of Ahámad Shah Dorra@n^'s empire; but this could only provide seasonal irrigation, given the river's natural discharge being so irregular and so scanty in the summer months. Perennial irrigation only became possible in recent times, thanks to the construction of a reservoir dam at Dahla, 34 km northeast of Qandaha@r. The dam was built between Ôowza@, 1329 [1]./June, 1950 and Ôad^, 1330 [1]./January, 1952 with American aid as part of the large-scale regional development project of the Helmand-Arg@anda@b Valley Authority (HAVA). Its height above the river bed is 50 m and its west length is 540 m. Part of the river's high cold season water flows is stored in the reservoir, a lake covering about 30 km2, and released to supplement the low hot season flows. The dam is not equipped for hydroelectric generation. Numerous old-style irrigation canals on both banks of the river have benefited from the partial regularization of the discharge. Between the Dahla dam and the Do@r^ confluence there are twenty-three such canals with a total capacity of 18.4 m3 per second on the right bank and thirteen with a total capacity of 5.7 m3 per second on the left bank; below the confluence there are fifteen and eleven canals respectively, with ungauged capacities. The construction of the dam has also prompted some remodeling of the old irrigation network of the Qandaha@r oasis, mainly in its eastern part. The key component of the new system is a large canal on the left bank, called the South Canal, which diverts from the river 18 km below the dam; it has a capacity of 42.5 m3 per second and is 74 km long. As a result of this reorganization, 24 km of old canals which were rendered useless have been filled up and put under cultivation. The scheme has yielded benefits which are far from negligible. Table 7 shows that the introduction of perennial irrigation has (in broad terms) made possible a sixty-two percent increase in the cultivated area in the Qandaha@r oasis and a remarkable development of summer crops, particularly orchards and vineyards (apricots, pomegranates, grapes and the cultivated area rose three- and-a-half fold between 1951 and 1974). These advances, however, have not been achieved without consequential risks. In the first place, perennial irrigation has raised the level of the ground water table, causing drainage problems and even marsh conditions in some areas; the construction of open drainage canals (about 100 km between 1961 and 1969) has not wholly obviated this danger. Secondly, the heavy suspended sediment in the Arg@anda@b's waters is silting up the Dahla reservoir at a rapid rate. The reservoir's original storage capacity of 479 million m3 had fallen to 403 million in 1976, i.e., suffered an average annual loss of 65 percent. At this rate the reservoir will lose half of its storage capacity by the year 2040. The resulting prospective decline in summer irrigation potential poses a long-term threat to the Qandaha@r oasis. |
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